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Modern technology has drastically changed the way we interact and consume information. For
example, online social platforms allow for seamless communication exchanges at an unprecedented
scale. However, we are still bounded by cognitive and temporal constraints. Our attention is
limited and extremely valuable. Algorithmic personalisation has become a standard approach to
tackle the information overload problem. As result, the exposure to our friends’ opinions and
our perception about important issues might be distorted. However, the effects of algorithmic
gatekeeping on our hyper-connected society are poorly understood. Here, we devise an opinion
dynamics model where individuals are connected through a social network and adopt opinions as
function of the view points they are exposed to. We apply various filtering algorithms that select
the opinions shown to users i) at random ii) considering time ordering or iii) their current beliefs.
Furthermore, we investigate the interplay between such mechanisms and crucial features of real
networks. We found that algorithmic filtering might influence opinions’ share and distributions,
especially in case information is biased towards the current opinion of each user. These effects
are reinforced in networks featuring topological and spatial correlations where echo chambers and
polarisation emerge. Conversely, heterogeneity in connectivity patterns reduces such tendency.
We consider also a scenario where one opinion, through nudging, is centrally pushed to all users.
Interestingly, even minimal nudging is able to change the status quo moving it towards the desired
view point. Our findings suggest that simple filtering algorithms might be powerful tools to regulate
opinion dynamics taking place on social networks.
Introduction
Various disciplines, as for example Sociology, Psychology and Behavioral Genetics, investigate the mechanisms
leading to opinion formation in groups of people [1–5]. Generally speaking, opinions are formed by a combination
of self-reflection, external information sources and real-world experiences that contribute to the individual reasoning
process. Furthermore, it has been argued that social interactions are fundamental in this process since they can
be used to spread and exchange information (e.g. word-of-mouth and communication) as well as to shape opinion
formation (e.g. social pressure and social support) through peer’s social influence. In this context, both the authority
and number of contacts affect the opinion of individuals [6–8]. Apart from the natural process of influencing the
opinions as well as behaviours of family, friends and co-workers [9, 10], social influence has been studied in marketing,
politics and health interventions [11–13].
The increasing popularity of social media augments the share on daily social interactions and thus their importance
in the dynamics of information exchange, potentially enhancing the power of online social influence. In fact, the low
cost of interacting with multiple people, simultaneously or asynchronously, without geographical constrains, facilitates
the exchange of information at a faster pace and with a diverse set of contacts. Despite such unprecedented possibilities
for interactions and consumption of information, we are still bounded by cognitive and temporal constraints [14–25]. As
a consequence, ideas, memes, individuals, companies and institutions compete for our limited attention which, in the
current landscape, has acquired a real economic value [26, 27]. In this context, social platforms use algorithms tailored
to improve the online experience by ordering and filtering information judged relevant to a particular individual (or
social media user). Seemingly innocuous, algorithms are designed to keep users engaged and select which information
is presented to them. They act as gatekeepers and intermediaries of information, functions that traditionally have
been covered by news papers and thus by hand curated editorial choices [28]. The shift towards algorithmic curation
seems a natural consequence of the digital revolution. However, its short and long term societal effects are far from
clear and matter of a heated debate. Before summarising some of the central points of such discussion, it is important
to provide a better idea about the mechanisms driving algorithmic personalisation in the context of online social
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2platforms. Indeed, algorithms are ruling a wealth of applications that go beyond social media. Examples are search
engines, online shops and services.
Every time we access Facebook, or similar platforms, we experience algorithmic curation. In fact our News Feed
is the complex result of what people and companies connected to the Internet do. In 2013 Facebook reported that
every time we visit our News Feed we could be exposed on average to 1, 500 stories from our friends, people and
pages we follow and other content that is sponsored [29, 30]. Out of this pool, they prioritise around 300 stories.
While the details of the algorithm behind the personalisation are a corporate secret, we know that they are based
on a combination of explicit information we provide such as demographics, likes, friendship relations, interests and
implicit information derived from previous interactions with the platform, IP addresses, locations, cookies, posts age,
page relationships, and content quality etc [28, 31]. All this information is then fused with three main principles of
content curation: popularity, semantic and collaborative filtering [32]. The first refers to the practice of promoting
content that is popular across the platform. The second recommends posts similar to those previously consumed.
Similarity is measured according to a range of features such as topics, words, authors, among others. The third refers
to the tendency to suggest what people similar or close to us consume.
The critics of algorithmic personalisation consider such practices possibly very dangerous. Recommendations might
increase the divide, exacerbating the phenomena of filter bubbles and echo-chambers [33–35]. They might remove
opposing view points and homogenise the type of information we are exposed to. The phenomenon is often described
as the threat of invisibility because, in a society where more and more people use social platforms to gather information
and form opinions, also what is not shown to us might be very important [36–38]. The homogenisation of information
based on past preferences and actions might also reduce the possibility of serendipitous discoveries of new interests,
sources, people, etc [31]. Algorithmic gatekeeping might suffer from technical biases induced by the limitations of the
databases they use and the codes they are based on [39, 40]. Algorithms are data hungry. This raises ethical concerns
about the access and sharing of potentially sensitive information [41, 42]. Finally, social media platforms are large
for-profit corporations driven by shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests. There is clearly, at least in principle, a
friction between societal and commercial objectives that might result in the so called corrupt personalisation [41, 43].
The proponents of algorithmic personalisation paint a far less scarier picture. First, without algorithmic filtering social
platforms would be much more demanding and probably less appealing to users [41, 44]. Indeed, as mentioned above,
the data produced nowadays is simply too much for any type of manual filtering. Personalisation might be positive
with respect to alternatives simply based on popularity metrics which could induce even stronger homogenisation of
information [45]. Some recent results suggest that the possible biases created by different personalisation algorithms
are very similar to those resulting from hand curation [32]. Others show how the homogeneity and popularity bias
are not the same across platforms and services [46]. Finally, algorithmic gatekeeping can be developed having in mind
the perils of filter bubbles and the importance of serendipity and heterogeneity in information [33]. To this point
however, it is important to stress how the effects of algorithmic gatekeeping are largely not well understood. Thus
the design of optimal solutions are far from trivial and possibly counter intuitive [47]. Indeed, the complexity of the
processes involved makes predicting the effects of new features very hard and the very idea of optimal is relative. In
fact, at its roots, it depends also on the specific definition of democracy considered [33].
In this background, we study, from a theoretical point of view, the effects of algorithmic personalisation on a
population of networked individuals. We model online interactions where users both share their opinions in their
timeline and update their own following the information exposed to them. In these settings, we consider the impact
of different personalisation algorithms that prioritise the information shown to each user according to time ordering
or their opinions expressed in previous interactions with the system. We then study a scenario in which a particular
opinion is centrally posted in all users’ timelines. We refer to this as nudge and we assume that the social platform
introduces, promotes, and pushes a particular opinion to all users thus nudging the population towards it. In all cases,
we study the effect of each filtering method as a function of different i) initial conditions, and ii) network topologies
where the interactions take place.
Materials and Methods
We devise a mechanistic model to analyze the impact of social interactions and algorithmic exposure on the individ-
ual and group opinion dynamics. In particular, we consider a simple bipartisan model of opinion dynamics in which
users can select between two opinions: A or B. Users might decide to change their status according to the fraction of
posts shown in their timelines promoting each opinion. Our model assumes that only part of the information shared
by friends is shown to the users. This is the fundamental idea beyond algorithmic curation. We then study how
different methods used to create the personalisation affects the evolution of opinions in the system. We first look at
the effect of sorting information randomly, according to time or previous ideological leanings expressed by each user
in previous posts (semantic filtering). Then we consider a scenario in which one specific opinion is pushed in the
3timeline of each user.
The opinion formation model contains three parts (Fig. S1). The first is the underlying social network structure
connecting users through friendship ties. The second is the activation mechanism that defines the timings in which
information is exchanged between users through the social network. The third part is the algorithmic filtering
mechanism that selects which information is presented in the user’s timeline (i.e. the posts actually seen by the user).
The model has some similarities and is inspired by previous research. Wang et al [16] proposed a model to mimic
the spreading of memes on Twitter. In their approach, users’ timelines are populated by posts from other users.
With the aim to study the mechanisms behind the popularity of memes, they considered time ordered timelines in
which posts survive only for a limited period of time. However, they did not considered opinion dynamics, but the
spreading of memes. Also, they did not investigate the effects of different sorting algorithms. More recently, Rossi et
al [48] shed some light, as we aim here, on the feedback between opinions and algorithmic personalisation. To this
end, they proposed a model in which a single user interacts with a news aggregator which recommends news items to
the user. In their model, they considered rather realistic scenarios in which the user might be subject to confirmation
biases and the aggregator tries to optimise the number of clicks of the user. However, the model neglects the network
effects induced by the interaction of multiple users connected via social ties. Finally, one of the areas that received
more attention, probably due to data availability, focuses on the effects of algorithms on customer choices [49–52].
Although, some of these papers study the interplay between algorithmic personalisation and social interactions, they
consider purchase or more in general items selection (i.e. books) which are driven by different processes than those
we are considering here. For example, purchasing power, popularity of items, reviews of products, among others, are
critical ingredients in those cases.
Network Structure
The social network structure is fixed and defined as a set of N users (i.e. network nodes) connected by undirected
links (i, j). The distribution of contacts, clustering, and small world phenomena are well known features of networks
that might have a strong effects on opinion dynamics or more in general complex contagion processes [8, 53–56].
To isolate the role of topology and its interplay with the various algorithmic personalisation strategies, we consider
three types of networks models. The first is a random network following the configuration model [57] with power-law
(heterogeneous) degree distribution (P (k) ∝ k−2.5) with kmin = 2. These parameters produce small-world networks
with an average degree 〈k〉 = 5.5 and an average clustering coefficient 〈C〉 = 10−3. The second is the Watts-Strogatz
model [58] where each node is initially connected to six (i.e. 〈k〉 = 6) friends in a ring configuration; with probability
g a link is rewired to a uniformly chosen random node. In the following, we consider three configurations of the
model by setting g = 0, g = 10−2, and g = 1. The three values of g all produce networks with homogeneous
degree distributions but allow us to explore very different combination of clustering and average path length. The
first network is characterised by high values of clustering 〈C〉 = 3(〈k〉−2)4(〈k〉−1) = 〈C(0)〉 = 0.6 [59] and a very large
average path length which is known to scale as N/(2〈k〉). The second instead, by a large value of the clustering
〈C(g)〉 = 〈C(0)〉(1 − g)3 = 0.58 [59]. However, in contrast with the first case, this network is characterised by
the small-world phenomenon. The third, is instead a random network with negligible clustering (〈C〉 = 〈k〉N−1 ) and
characterised by the small-world phenomenon. The final type of network we consider is a regular 2D lattice with
periodic boundary conditions. Each node has degree 4, the clustering coefficient is zero, and the average path length
is very large due to spatial clustering between nodes. In our simulations, we use N = 105 and run the simulations
taking averages over 10 independent realisations of the networks with the same fixed parameters (except for the lattice
which is not subject to random fluctuations). In summary (see Table S1), the first type of networks, CM for short,
is characterised by a heterogeneous degree distribution, negligible clustering and short average path length. The
second type of networks, WS for short, features homogeneous degree distributions as well as i) high clustering and
large average path length (for g = 0) ii) high clustering and short average path length (for g = 10−2) iii) negligible
clustering and short average path length (for g = 1). Finally, the regular lattice, LA for short, is characterised by a
homogeneous degree distribution, zero clustering, and large average path length. Altogether, these networks allow to
isolate and contrast the interplay and interactions of the three topological features with the sorting algorithms.
Nodes Activation
With probability pi, each user i becomes active during one time-step t. When the user becomes active, it first
broadcasts its current opinion to all its friends, for example by writing a post, then updates its own looking at its
personal timeline Ri(t). In particular, a user whose timeline shows 30% of posts promoting opinion A and thus 70%
4Network Type Degree Distribution High Clustering Small World
CM Heterogeneous x X
WS, g = 0 Homogeneous X x
WS, g = 10−2 Homogeneous X X
WS, g = 1 Homogeneous x X
LA Homogeneous x x
TABLE S1: Main networks’ features summary. In the table CM stands for Configuration model, WS for Watts and Strogatz
model, and LA for regular lattice.
promoting opinion B, will adopt opinion B with probability 0.7 and opinion A with probability 0.3. In other words,
the updates are done proportionally to the share of posts promoting each opinion in the timelines. Although the most
common opinion shown to each user will be most likely adopted, the process is not deterministic. In fact, there is a
level of randomness which is an important component of opinion formation and dynamics [7]. In the main text, we
consider a scenario in which the activation probabilities are extracted from a power-law distribution (F (p) ∼ p−1.5
with p ∈ [0.01, 1]). Indeed, analyses of real online social networks show that the propensity of each user to start a
social interaction follows an heterogeneous distribution [60, 61]. In the Supplemental Information (SI), we consider
the case of a constant activation probability (p = 0.1, which is the average of the heterogeneous case) across the entire
population. The results are qualitatively similar to the homogeneous case.
Algorithmic Personalisation and Filtering
At time t, each user i has a hidden list Li(t) containing all the opinions received from its friends since the last time
tlast that user i was active, i.e. Li(t) contains all opinions posted by i’s friends during [tlast, t), plus the opinions in
user i timeline at time tlast (Ri(tlast)).
We consider different methods, see Figure S1D, to select items from the list Li(t) and thus create the timeline
Ri(t): (i) select Q random items from Li(t) (reference method, named REF), (ii) show older posts first (old method,
OLD), (iii) sort the list Li(t) from the most recent to the oldest received and show most recent posts first (recent
method, REC), (iv) sort Li(t) according to i’s current opinion (e.g. if i’s opinion is A, sort the list as AAA . . . BBB)
(preference method, PR), (v) given any of the sorting method just described, a random fraction z of opinions in this
list is replaced by a pre-defined opinion centrally chosen (nudge method, NU). In all the scenarios the timeline Ri(t)
is a subset of this virtual list Li(t) and has maximum length Q. The remaining of the list is discarded once a timeline
is formed at a given time t. In the main text we set Q = 20, but as we show in the SI its value has little impact on
the results.
Results
In this section, we study the effects of sorting algorithms on the group and on the individual opinion dynamics by
first looking at methods REF, OLD, REC and PR. Then we investigate the effect of nudging, or centrally controlled
bias.
Opinion dynamics subject to algorithmic personalisation
If we start the networks with two opinions A and B, in equal proportions (PA = 0.5 and PB = 0.5) and uniformly
distributed among the users (i.e. nodes), the prevalence of both opinions remains stable around the starting values
for all four sorting methods for various network configurations (first row in Fig. S2). Thus, in these scenarios all the
filtering algorithms are not able to break the status quo. Both ideas are able to coexist and the social platform does
not drive the system towards a different equilibrium with respect to the initial status. If the opinions are unequal
from the start (PA = 0.2 and PB = 0.8), the prevalence also remains stable for the methods REC, REF and OLD
during the entire observation period (second row in Fig. S2). Indeed, as the order in which posts appears in the list Li
of each user is random and regulated by the activation process of its neighbours, introducing a temporal bias (in the
case of REC and OLD) does not affect the share (20− 80) of opinions in each timeline thus preserving the status quo.
On the other hand, the preference method (PR) leads to a decrease in the prevalence of the minority opinion (PA)
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FIG. S1: Schematic representation of the opinion dynamics model. In the plot we focus on the user i in the center of panels
A-C. It is connected with eight other users that are depicted around. For simplicity, we assume that these users are connected
only to the central user i thus their opinions or timelines will not change or be updated until user i will be active. Active users
are represented in red and the list (i.e. Li) of posts that user i could possibly see is described by the boxes. Panel A shows
the initial state. Opinions are drawn randomly and the Li is initially empty. At the next time step (panel B) two friends of
i are active and post their opinions thus Li starts to be filled. At the next time step (panel C) other friends become active
and so on. In panel D we show what would happen in case user i becomes active. We assume Q = 3 (red vertical line) and
show the effect of different algorithmic personalisation schemes: i) REF, the list is random shuffled; ii) OLD, does not change
the order, the posts are shown in the order they were posted; iii) REC, recent posts are prioritized; iv) PR, shows the effects
of a personalisation that prioritise posts according the preference/opinion of i; v) NU, shows the nudge case in which one
post (in red), z = 1/3, shown to the user does not come from its friends but it is imposed by the social platform. For each
scenario we show the probability that the user i would have to change opinion. In all scenarios only the first Q posts after the
personalisation affect the opinion of i. The rest are deleted.
that mainly occurs within the initial 200 time steps across all networks. In an unbalanced situation, the ordering of
opinions according to users’ preferences, for users holding opinion B, might lead to the disappearance of the opposite
idea from their timeline. Effectively, such semantic filtering brings to zero the probability of such users to change
idea (the visibility of the others is zero) thus modifying the initial share and increasing the already dominant position
of opinion B. It is important to notice that although the less popular opinion decreases its share, it is still able to
survive. As shown in the SI, the survival happens even in case of much skewed initial configurations such as 1− 99.
Results are similar for all network configurations, but for the WS network with g = 1 the decrease in PA occurs earlier
in time and PA stabilises at lower values (PA(500) = 0.06, see Fig. S2-I). The CM network reaches larger values
(PA(500) = 0.08) which are however slightly smaller than the other three networks (PA(500) = 0.09). Altogether,
these results point to the fact that the PR filtering mechanism, in case of unbalanced initial conditions, causes more
biases in networks characterised by null clustering, short path length, and homogeneous degree distributions. The
heterogeneity in contact patterns hampers the reduction of the less popular opinion due to the presence of hubs which
limit the effectiveness of the algorithm to hide the subordinate opinion. High values of clustering both in combination
with low and high average path length behave as in the case of regular lattice which features null clustering, high
spatial correlations and high average path length. This result suggests that correlations in the connectivity patterns
hamper the effectiveness of semantic filtering with respect to uncorrelated cases, which is qualitatively in line with
previous research on recommender systems mentioned above [49].
The interplay between the features of the sorting mechanisms and the network structure might induce the formation
of opinion clusters (echo chambers) and polarization in the population. Figure S3 shows the distribution of the fraction
of users i whose friends (nearest neighbours,nn for short) share the opinion A at t = 500, 〈PnnA 〉. In these plots, the
region of the x-axis close to one describes neighbourhoods formed by a majority of users sharing opinion A. Conversely,
the region of the x-axis close to zeros describes neighbourhoods in which none, or very few users, adopt opinion A. In
order to remove spurious effects, on the y-axis we show FN (〈PnnA 〉) that is obtained dividing the average distribution
of opinions in each neighbourhood at time t = 500 with its correspondent value at t = 0. In doing so, to avoid issues
with the binning, we imposed 10 equispaced bins (∆x = 0.1) in all cases.
For equal starting conditions (PA = 0.5 and PB = 0.5) (first row in Fig. S3), we notice that CM and WS (g = 1)
behave similarly. The distribution of opinions in the neighbourhood of all nodes is similar to the initial (random)
configuration. The PR mechanism, in the case of WS with g = 1, produces two little spikes at zero and one
which indicate the emergence of low levels of polarisation in the network. Thus, the semantic filtering, in networks
characterised by homogeneous degree distributions, null clustering, and short average path length, is able to produce
few patches like-minded people which however do not form in case of heterogeneous connectivity patterns (CM
network). The polarisation effects of the filtering algorithms, in particular PR, are much stronger in the other
networks. Indeed, in highly clustered networks, independently of the average path length (WS graphs with g = 0 and
g = 10−2) the sorting mechanisms induce the emergence of strong opinion polarisation. As shown in the SI, if the
size of the timelines is comparable with the degree (i.e. Q = 5), REC and REF filtering methods produce stronger
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FIG. S2: Evolution of group opinion in the various network models. The prevalence PA(t) of opinion A over time for starting
PA(0) = 0.5 and PB(0) = 0.5 (first row) and PA(0) = 0.2 and PB(0) = 0.8 (second row). Each column describes the results for
one of the networks. In each plot, we show results for the four sorting algorithms. Each plot is the average of 102 independent
simulations and to improve the visualisation we are showing the data points every 50 time steps. In all scenarios we set Q = 20.
polarization effects in combination with high clustering in the contacts patterns. This is due to the fact that the
PR mechanism in these cases might over represent the local minority opinion, thus hampering the convergence to a
local majority. Echo chambers appear, although to smaller degree, also in case of strong spatial correlations and null
clustering (LA network). These observations provide further evidence that topological as well as spatial correlations
are important features for algorithmic filtering and that heterogeneity in contact patterns has a slightly stronger
potential to hamper the formation of each chambers in comparison to homogeneous patterns. In fact, in combination
with the filtering mechanisms, these features induce a re-organisation of the distribution of opinions creating compact
domains made of like-minded nodes (echo chambers). This observation aligns with previous results in the literature
of complex contagion processes on complex networks [62]. The polarisation emerges even if the total fraction of the
population with opinion A or B is the same and stable as function of time (Fig. S2). Thus, although the interplay
between the topological features and algorithm filtering does not change the status quo, it might introduce high levels
of polarisation and echo chambering.
The case of unbalanced starting conditions (i.e. PA = 0.2 and PB = 0.8) confirms this picture (second row in
Fig. S3). In fact, the behaviour of CM and WS (g = 1) networks is still very similar. The absence of topological
clustering and the presence of short cuts between parts of the network (small-world phenomenon) does not allow the
emergence of echo chambers around the dominant opinion. This is somehow surprising considering that opinion B
reaches around 90% of the population. There is an exception however, the semantic filtering (PR method) fights
against this tendency. As mentioned above, this personalisation algorithm reduces the visibility of the few nodes
holding opinion A that might be present in neighbourhoods of B nodes. The effective reduction of the share of
nodes with opinion A in such configuration brings the system to a different, and lower, equilibrium as eventually such
nodes change opinion to B. This is confirmed by the fact that across the entire x-axis (with exception of x = 0) the
average number of neighbours holding some fraction of opinion A decreases for all network models. The presence of
heterogeneous connectivity patterns in CM networks reduces the effectiveness of such effect. Figure S3F-L shows that
the three other sorting algorithms, OLD above all, induce a relatively higher number of echo chambers around the
subordinate opinion in WS (g = 1) networks. As such effects are reduced in CM networks, we can speculate that this
is due to the interaction between the algorithms and homogeneous contact patterns.
Also for unbalanced initial conditions, topological and spatial correlations induce a much stronger polarisation
(notice the log scale on the y-axis). In particular, in networks with high values of clustering, the number of A
echo chambers is two orders of magnitude larger than in the initial configuration. Spatial correlations introduce less
stronger effects which are however of the order of a factor 6. Overall, these results suggest that correlations interacts
with the sorting algorithms creating compact domains that, in this case, boost the survival of the less common opinion
with respect to the other two networks.
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FIG. S3: Opinions of friends. We show the distribution of the fraction of friends (nearest neighbours, nn) of i with the same
opinion A at t = 500. We normalise the y-axis by dividing for the same quantity computed at t = 0. In the first row we
show the results for starting conditions PA(0) = 0.5 and PB(0) = 0.5. In the second row, for starting conditions PA(0) = 0.2
and PB(0) = 0.8. Each column describes the results for a particular network. Each plot is the average of 10
2 independent
simulations. In each plot, we consider the four ranking algorithms and set Q = 20.
Nudging Scenario
We now consider the same filter algorithms studied in the previous section with the added feature that a random
fraction z of opinions, in the list Li(t) shown to each user i, is replaced by a pre-defined opinion centrally chosen
and fixed in time (see Fig.S1-D). In other words, we are investigating a scenario in which the social platform, where
the interactions take place, nudges the users towards a particular opinion. In doing so, a fraction of the opinions
shown to a user is substituted with ideas that might or might not be representative of what its nearest neighbours
are posting. In the following, we set z = 0.1, Q = 20 and chose A as the centrally set opinion. Independently of
the starting conditions (balanced or unbalanced prevalence of A and B), the group opinion moves towards A for all
network configurations and sorting algorithms (Fig. S4). In the case of unbalanced starting conditions (i.e. PA = 0.2
and PB = 0.8), opinion A may become dominant as early as t ∼ 100 time steps and typically no later than t ∼ 150.
At t = 500 almost the entire population turned to opinion A. Across the board, the REF method is the most efficient
at t = 500 to nudge the population opinion towards A. This is more evident with unbalanced initial conditions.
Arguably, this is due to the fact that this filtering method (REF) is the least biased towards the current and past
opinions hold by each user and its neighbours. The OLD method instead, in the balanced case, is significantly slower
than the rest. By nature, this sorting algorithm slows down the overall drift of the system by showing to each user
old neighbours’ beliefs. In contrast to the results in the previous section, method PR performs in between the other
methods.
In order to gather a better understanding of the impact of different sorting algorithms and networks topologies in
the nudging process, in Fig. S5 we show the time T ∗ that the opinion A needs to take over the entire population. To
reduce the computational cost of the simulations, we set 104 as time limit, thus the actual T ∗ for the curves that reach
such threshold is higher. The first observation is that the OLD sorting mechanism is, across the board, the slowest
to reach convergence. The OLD method introduces a delay by promoting the oldest posts of each neighbours, which,
over time, might sponsor a different opinion with respect to the opinion the focus nodes currently hold. The second
observation is that for z = 0.05, thus when only one opinion is centrally replaced in the list of each user (since Q = 20),
the PR sorting algorithm is generally faster than the OLD method but slower than the others. This is particularly
visible in the case of networks with topological (WS networks with g = 0 and g = 10−2) or spatial correlations
(LA network). As mentioned above, correlations interact with the semantic filtering (PR) creating relatively strong
echo chambers which shield its members protecting them from the nudged opinion. The third observation is that for
z ≥ 0.15, the time for convergence for the REF, REC, and PR methods becomes a very weak function of z and of
the initial share of the two opinions. Fourth, as also noted in Fig. S4, the REF filtering mechanism, which does not
introduce any type of bias in the ordering of neighbours’ posts, is the fastest to reach convergence in all topologies.
In the case of networks with negligible clustering and small average shortest path (WS networks with g = 1) the
convergence, for z = 0.05, is reached faster than in the other topologies. The comparison with the CM networks
points one more time to the fact that heterogeneous connectivity patterns hamper both local (as seen before) and
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FIG. S4: Evolution of population opinion with central influencer (nudging). The prevalence PA(t) of opinion A over time for
starting conditions PA(0) = 0.5 and PB(0) = 0.5 in the first row; PA(0) = 0.2 and PB(0) = 0.8 in the second row. Each column
describes the results for a particular network. In each plot, we set Q = 20 and show results for the four sorting algorithms.
Each plot is the average of 102 independent simulations and to improve the visualisation data points are shown every 50 time
steps.
global convergence (as seen now) to a single opinion.
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FIG. S5: Time for convergence. We show the time T ∗ that the nudged opinion needs to converge (i.e. be shared by all nodes) as
function of z. We set 104 as maximal time of convergence of the simulations. In he first row we show the results for PA(0) = 0.5
and PB(0) = 0.5; in the second row we show the results for PA(0) = 0.2 and PB(0) = 0.8. In each plot, we set Q = 20 and each
column describes the results for a particular network model. Each plot is the average of 10 independent simulations.
Figure S6 shows the normalised distribution of the fraction of neighbours sharing opinion A at t = 500 for both
starting conditions. Since opinion B is almost extinguished in both cases, the distributions are all asymmetric and
skewed towards values of 〈PnnA 〉 close to one. Across all networks, the system is converging towards opinion A and a
large number of neighbourhoods share all the same nudged opinion. Indeed, the reduction of all the other values of
〈PnnA 〉 is dramatic (note the logarithm scale on the y). The comparison between the CM and WS (g = 1) networks
shows how the heterogeneity in connectivity patterns alone hampers the formation of echo chambers around the
dominant opinion.
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FIG. S6: Opinions of friends. The distribution of the fraction of friends of i with the same opinion as i at t = 500. The y-axis
is normalised by dividing by the same quantity computed at t = 0. In the first row, we show the results for starting conditions
PA(0) = 0.5 and PB(0) = 0.5. In the second row, we show the results for starting conditions PA(0) = 0.2 and PB(0) = 0.8.
Columns show the results for different networks. Each plot is the average of 102 independent simulations and we set Q = 20.
Discussion
Technology has dramatically reduced the cost of communications and vastly increased their reach. As consequence,
the amount of information produced at any given moment far surpasses our ability to consume it. Individuals,
companies, and institutions alike compete for our attention that has acquired a real economic value. For example,
online social platforms such as Twitter and Facebook profit from our engagement with their systems. Thus, optimising
our experience is a key part of their business model. To this end, they adopt algorithmic personalisation which broadly
describes a range of automated methods that filter the information to which we are exposed to. The filtering is not
random, but targeted to stimulate our interests and online activity. Generally speaking the aims of algorithmic filtering
are benign. However, in our hyper-connected society they might have unintended and unanticipated consequences.
One area of concern is the possibility that such methods, which often are black boxes, affect opinion formation and
dynamics. As many of our social interactions are mediated by such platforms and since much of the information
gathering and exposure happen online, the perception of our friends as well as of specific issues might be distorted
by such algorithms. These concerns are now mainstream and the words echo chamber, confirmation bias, and filter
bubbles have become a staple in the news cycle. Despite the heated debate the effect of algorithmic filtering on opinion
dynamics is still largely not understood.
In this paper, we studied the effect of different filtering algorithms on the opinion dynamics of a population of
interconnected individuals. We modelled their interactions having in mind prototypical online platforms where users
post their opinions which appear in friends’ timelines. Due to the limited attention of each user, timelines are curated
by means of algorithmic personalisation. We considered different scenarios where posts are selected i) randomly, ii) as
function of the time when they were posted, and iii) as function of previous posts of users (semantic filtering). Even
more, we studied how the features of the connectivity patterns mediating the interactions between users interplay with
filtering algorithms and possibly affect opinions. In particular, we considered three different types of networks which
allow us to isolate and contrast three main properties of real networks i) heterogeneity in degree distributions, ii) high
values of clustering, and iii) small-world phenomenon. Finally, we investigated another scenario in which the social
platform where interactions take place tries to nudge the population towards a particular opinion by manipulating a
fraction of the posts in users’ timelines.
For simplicity we investigated a bipartisan system in which users can adopt one of two opinions, i.e. A or B. We
studied two very different initial configurations where the share of opinion A was equal (50−50) or much lower (20−80)
than B. In these settings, we found that, independently of the social network structure, the sorting mechanisms are
not able to change the status quo when the prevalence of opinions is equally distributed in the population. Despite the
overall share of opinions does not change, we observed that some features of the networks interact with the filtering
algorithms inducing polarisation effects. In particular, we found that topological (high values of clustering) and to
a lesser extent spatial (proximity of nodes in a regular lattice) correlations create compact domains (echo chambers)
formed only by like-minded individuals. Despite the algorithmic personalisation, absence of correlations, especially
in conjunction with heterogeneity in the contacts patterns, hamper the formation of such echo chambers. In case of
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unbalanced initial conditions, we found that semantic filtering induces a further increase of the predominant opinion
because of positive reinforcement. Also in this scenario correlations play a significant role hampering the reinforcement
by creating compact domains around the subordinate opinion that effectively is able to protect such minorities. As
mentioned above the absence of topological, or the presence of spatial, correlations hinders the formation of echo
chambers, even those centred around the dominant opinion.
If a centralised bias mechanism (i.e. nudging) is introduced, population opinion can move towards the nudged opinion
relatively fast and eventually completely switch the status quo. In this case, filtering algorithms that randomly select
friends’ opinions or that give preference to the most recent ones speedup convergence to the centrally desired opinion.
Conversely, methods biased towards older posts are the slowest to reach convergence. Semantic filtering, in case
only a single post in users timelines is manipulated, slows down convergence especially in networks characterised by
topological or spatial correlations. In these cases, the emergence of echo chambers opposes the change towards the
nudged opinion.
Overall, our results support the view that opinion dynamics can be manipulated by algorithmic personalisation
methods. Furthermore, they highlight the interplay between filtering mechanisms and the features of the networks
where interactions take place. In particular, correlations in contacts patterns are key ingredients that might lead to
the emergence of polarisation and echo chambers even in case of equal share between opinions. Our results show that
filtering algorithms might exacerbate polarisation but the organisation of social ties is a key factor. Conversely, the
absence of correlations, especially in conjunction with heterogeneous distributions of contacts hampers the creation of
compact domains. These results are in line with the literature of complex contagion processes on complex networks [8,
53, 54]. The study of the nudging scenario shows how the dominant opinion in the population can completely switch
within short time by moderately pushing a desired opinion. This idea is supported by the Nudge Theory in behavioural
economics originally developed by Richard Thaler [63] and by recent experiments on the emergence of conventions [64].
The vulnerability of social media to manipulations can be disastrous because nudging for example can be easily
introduced by the company controlling the media, by external players through paid advertisement or by the use of
bots [65]. There are claims that such strategies have been used to bias political public opinion in recent years [66, 67].
Not least, since positive reinforcement mechanisms may increase opinion polarisation according to our study, the
spread of fake news, that tend to spread faster than true news [68, 69], may generate local convergence of opinion
that later leads to the emergence of bubbles and group isolation [70]. In light of democratic access to information, a
common and intuitive idea is that social media developers should make efforts to minimise opinion biases by increasing
the diversity of opinions received from friends and counter-balancing the content of advertisements. However, recent
empirical evidence points out that the actual dynamics at play are much more complex [47]. Indeed, the exposure
to opposite view points might further increase polarisation [47]. Thus, the research on the feedback between opinion
dynamics and algorithmic personalisation is just in its infancy.
Our model aims to capture key mechanisms driving online social interactions and opinion dynamics. It has however
some limitations since it disregards other potentially relevant mechanisms. In particular, our model does not consider
that constantly diverging friends may stop following each other and thus their opinions are not shared. This manual
curation, complementary to the automated curation included in our model, might further contribute to the formation
of opinion bubbles and likely boosts biases towards the users’ own opinion. Future models should include manual
curation taking into account the user’s own memory of his or her friends opinions. In the language of modern Network
Science this will imply the development of adaptive and time-varying networks models that couple the dynamics of
the networks (link formation) with the dynamics on the networks (opinion dynamics). Another limitation is that users
have some level of resistance to change and thus some people need reinforced exposure to an opinion before switching.
This may affect the timing, possibly delaying, and the likelihood to switch the prevalent opinion in the population.
Also, friends do not necessarily have the same authority and possibly information coming from specific friends, e.g.
close offline friends or relatives, may have higher importance on shaping the user’s opinions. Another limitation is
the type of filtering mechanisms considered. Future work should consider more complex and realistic models possibly
linked to the history and features of each user as well as the popularity of specific memes or information circulating
in the system. Finally, here we considered only some prototypical networks models as way to isolate three of the
main features of real networks. Other properties such as the presence of communities, high-order correlations, and
temporal connectivity patterns will be matter of future explorations.
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Supplemental Information for “Modeling opinion dynamics in the age of algorithmic polarization”.
Here, we provide supplemental information about the algorithmic filtering methods, the opinion dynamics model,
and we present a sensitivity analysis to study the robustness of the results to the variation of the main parameters.
A. Algorithmic Personalization Mechanisms
Due the limited attention of each node, we assume that the social platform, where interactions take place, shows
to each user a maximum of Q posts. Consider a node i. It is characterized by an activity pi which determine the
rate at which it engages with the social platform. This is extracted from a distribution F (p). In the main, text we
considered an heterogenous distribution, in section C we consider the case of a constant activity across the whole
network. Suppose that at time t node i holds opinion A which it was adopted by looking at the posts contained in
its timeline, Ri(tlast), the last time (tlast) it was active. Suppose that the node is now active. It first broadcasts its
opinion to all its neighbors (which might or might not see it due the filtering mechanism). Between time tlast and t
some of its neighbors might have been active and broadcasts their opinions. These go to an hidden list Li(t) which
contains also the posts in Ri(tlast). In case the list Li(t) is larger than Q, some posts are not shown to the user
and deleted. In fact the user will just see posts in its timeline Ri(t). The sorting process is defined by the algorithm
personalization mechanism under consideration. We considered four possible approaches:
• posts are selected randomly. This is the reference method (REF for short)
• posts are ordered considering the time when they were posted and the latest Q are selected. We call this method
REC, that stands for recent
• posts are ordered considering the time when they were posted and the oldest Q are selected. We call this method
OLD, as older posts are selected first
• posts are ordered considering the current opinion of the user which was formed by looking at the posts in
its timeline and was the subject of a post at time t. This mimic semantic filtering methods as the filtering
preferentially show to the user similar posts respect to what it recently broadcasted. We call this method PR
for short.
Each method selects Q posts from the list Li(t), thus in general |Ri(t)| ≤ Q.
B. Opinion Dynamics Model
After the algorithmic filtering, the node i is presented with a curated timeline Ri(t). Remember that we considered
a bipartisan system in which nodes can adopt one of two opinions, i.e. A or B. Thus the timeline, generally, contains
a|Ri(t)| posts in favor of A and b|Ri(t)| in favor of B. The user will then adopt opinion A with probability a and
opinion B with probability b. Thus, as mentioned in the main text the adoption process, although biased towards the
majority, is not deterministic. As long a and/or b are greater than zero the user can adopt the two opinions.
C. Sensitivity Analysis
Below, we will show the results for i) constant activation rates ii) different Q sizes iii) more unbalanced initial
conditions.
1. Constant activation rates
In the main text, we considered heterogenous activity patterns following a distribution F (p) ∼ p−1.5 with p ∈
[0.01, 1]. In these settings, the average activity 〈p〉 = 0.1. In this section, we show the results considering that each
node has the same activity p = 0.1. In Figure S7, we show the behavior of PA as function of time for all the network
topologies. In the first row, we show the results for a balanced initial condition in which PA(0) = PB(0) = 0.5, in the
second row instead PA(0) = 0.2 and PB(0) = 0.8. The results are in qualitatively in line with what shown in the main
text: none of the sorting mechanisms is able to break the status quo in case of balance initial conditions. Instead in the
14
case of unbalanced initial start the PR mechanism reduces the fraction of the subordinate opinion. Furthermore, the
largest reduction happens in the case WS networks with g = 1. Conversely, high values of the clustering coefficient,
independently of the average shortest path, hamper the reduction as well as heterogenous connectivity patterns.
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FIG. S7: Evolution of group opinion in the various network models. The prevalence PA(t) of opinion A over time for starting
from PA(0) = 0.5 and PB(0) = 0.5 (first row) and PA(0) = 0.2 and PB(0) = 0.8 (second row). Each column describes the
results for one of the networks. In each plot, we show results for the four sorting algorithms. Each plot is the average of 102
independent simulations and to improve the visualization we are showing the data points every 50 time steps. In all scenarios
we set Q = 20 and assume that each node as a constant activation probability p = 0.1.
In Figure S8, we show the distribution of the fraction of neighbours holding opinion A 〈PnnA 〉. In order to highlight
the difference respect to the initial conditions, on the y-axis we divided the distribution values at t = 500 for the same
quantity computed at t = 0, which is then normalized by the initial conditions. The results are in line with what
shown in the main text for heterogenous activity patterns. In particular, for a balanced starting condition (first row
in the figure) both topological (WS with g = 0 and g = 0.01) induce the emergence of polarization effects. These are
particularly visible for the semantic filtering (PR). Absence of clustering and heterogeneity in connectivity patterns
are not conductive for such phenomena to emerge. For unbalanced initial conditions (second row in the Figure),
the effects of clustering are much stronger. Semantic filtering induces the formations of echo chambers around the
dominant opinion across all network topologies. However, as shown in the main text, heterogeneity in the connectivity
patterns hamper this tendency.
D. Different queue sizes
We now turn to study the role of the queue sizes Q. In Figure S9 we show, for initial balanced conditions, the
normalized distribution of the fraction of neighbors holding opinion A for Q = 20 (first row), Q = 5 (second row),
and Q = 50 (third row). The results are qualitatively similar for all the values of Q. There are some differences in the
case of small queue sizes (Q = 5) in case of high clustered topologies (WS networks with g = 0 and g = 0.01). Here,
despite all the sorting mechanisms give rise to polarization, their efficiency is a bit different than for larger values of
Q. Indeed, for Q = 5 the methods REF and REC, that provide either a random sample or a the latest posts, produce
larger values of polarization than the PR method. Intuitively this is due to the fact that in case Q is small than the
average degree of nodes (which in for WS networks is 6) the PR mechanism might reduce the polarization effects. To
understand this effect think about the extreme situation in which nodes have all Q = 1. Consider a node i connected
with 5 nodes having opinion A and only one with opinion B. Assume that i holds opinion B. In case Q = 1 has long
as there is at least one neighbor with the same opinion the node will not change to A. Instead for larger values of Q,
despite the bias, the opinion A is likely to be more represented and eventually lead to a formation of cluster around
that opinion.
In Figure S10 we show the same plot considering however a 20− 80 initial conditions. The results are in line with
what discussed above and in the main text. In particular, topological and spatial correlation induce the formation of
echo chambers around the subordinate opinion. Also in this case these effects are stronger for REC and REF filtering
mechanism.
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FIG. S8: Opinions of friends. We show the distribution of the fraction of friends (nearest neighbors, nn) of i with the same
opinion A at t = 500. We normalize the y-axis by dividing for the same quantity computed at t = 0. In the first row we
show the results for starting conditions PA(0) = 0.5 and PB(0) = 0.5. In the second row, for starting conditions PA(0) = 0.2
and PB(0) = 0.8. Each column described the results for a particular network. Each plot is the average of 10
2 independent
simulations. In each plot, we consider the four ranking algorithms and set Q = 20 and assume that each node as a constant
activation probability p = 0.1.
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FIG. S9: Opinions of friends. We show the distribution of the fraction of friends (nearest neighbors, nn) of i with the same
opinion A at t = 500. We normalize the y-axis by dividing for the same quantity computed at t = 0. We show the results for
starting conditions PA(0) = 0.5 and PB(0) = 0.5. In the first row, we show the results for Q = 20, in the second for Q = 5, in
the third for Q = 50. Each column described the results for a particular network. Each plot is the average of 102 independent
simulations.
In Figure S11 we show the behavior of PA as function of time for Q = 5. As clear from the figure, the behavior
of the global share of the opinion is qualitatively similar to the other values of Q. For unbalanced initial conditions
the semantic filtering is still the only sorting mechanism that bring to a reduction of the subordinate opinion. High
clustering, spatial correlations, and heterogeneity in the degree distribution hamper the reduction respect to WS
graphs with g = 1 however to a less extent than for Q = 20.
E. 1− 99 and 10− 90 initial conditions
We now consider the behavior of PA(t) for different unbalanced conditions. In Figure S12 we show (first row) the
case of a quite unbalanced starting scenario: PA(0) = 0.01 and PB(0) = 0.99. As the opinion model we consider
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FIG. S10: Opinions of friends. We show the distribution of the fraction of friends (nearest neighbors, nn) of i with the same
opinion A at t = 500. We normalize the y-axis by dividing for the same quantity computed at t = 0. We show the results for
starting conditions PA(0) = 0.2 and PB(0) = 0.8. In the first row, we show the results for Q = 20, in the second for Q = 5, in
the third for Q = 50. Each column described the results for a particular network. Each plot is the average of 102 independent
simulations.
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FIG. S11: Evolution of group opinion in the various network models. The prevalence PA(t) of opinion A over time for starting
from PA(0) = 0.5 and PB(0) = 0.5 (first row) and PA(0) = 0.2 and PB(0) = 0.8 (second row). Each column describes the
results for one of the networks. In each plot, we show results for the four sorting algorithms. Each plot is the average of 102
independent simulations and to improve the visualization we are showing the data points every 50 time steps. In all scenarios
we set Q = 5.
is not based on a deterministic majority rule, the subordinate opinion is able to survive. Also in this case, the PR
mechanisms induces a reduction which is however hampered by correlations and heterogenous connectivity patterns
as shown in the main text for 20−80 case. In the second row we show the case in which PA(0) = 0.1 and PB(0) = 0.90
which provides the same qualitatively results.
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FIG. S12: Evolution of group opinion in the various network models. The prevalence PA(t) of opinion A over time for starting
from PA(0) = 0.01 and PB(0) = 0.99 (first row) and PA(0) = 0.1 and PB(0) = 0.9 (second row). Each column describes the
results for one of the networks. In each plot, we show results for the four sorting algorithms. Each plot is the average of 102
independent simulations and to improve the visualization we are showing the data points every 50 time steps. In all scenarios
we set Q = 20.
